Page 4
are serious and carry lengthy terms of imprisonment if convicted; the evidence proffered by the Government, including multiple corroborating and corroborated witnesses, is strong; the Defendant has substantial resources and foreign ties (including citizenship in a country that does not extradite its citizens); and the Defendant, who lived in hiding and apart from the family to whom she now asserts important ties, has not been fully candid about her financial situation." (Dec. Op. at 2). In seeking bail for a third time, the defendant's Motion rests principally on two additional bail conditions. Neither of these conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance in court, and neither outweighs all of the other factors that make this defendant an extreme flight risk. Moreover, the Court should reject as premature the defendant's assertion that her pretrial motions have somehow weakened the Government's case; those motions have not been adjudicated, and, for the reasons set forth in the Government's opposition memorandum, the defendant's motions have no merit.
In short, all three of the relevant Bail Reform Act factorsâthe nature and circumstances of the offense, the strength of the evidence, and the history and characteristics of the defendantâcontinue to weigh heavily in favor of detention, and the defendant's Motion does not present any information that warrants revisiting this Court's well-reasoned and detailed prior decisions.
A. Applicable Law
"After a court has made an initial determination that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the appearance of the Defendant as required, the Court may reopen the bail hearing if 'information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue' of whether pretrial detention is warranted." (Dec. Op. at 4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). "A court may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent authority, even where the circumstances do not match § 3142(f)'s statutory text." (Id. at 5). Although courts in this Circuit have recognized that "a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing," United States v. Rowe, No. 02 Cr. 756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003), generally the moving party must establish that its arguments "warrant reconsideration" by, for example, demonstrating "that the court overlooked information or incorrectly applied the law," or that failure to reconsider "would constitute manifest injustice." United States v. Petrov, No. 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015).
B. Discussion
The defendant's Motion rests on three arguments, none of which is availing. First, the defendant offers to renounce her foreign citizenship, claiming that this eliminates the risk that she will flee from prosecution. Second, the defendant offers to place some of her assets in a monitorship with unspecified terms, and which would still leave her with substantial unrestrained assets. Third, the defendant claims that her voluminous pretrial motions have diminished the strength of the Government's case. None of these arguments is persuasive, and the Motion should be denied.
DOJ-OGR-00001246
@epsteinpedia
CA:
AEb4NmMJF2x5kcp19M13RiXZuAGyajWSKLaioqBrpump
Document 12107-000
AI Analysis
Summary: The document is a court filing opposing the defendant's request for bail, arguing that the defendant poses a significant flight risk and that the government's case remains strong despite the defendant's pretrial motions. The court should deny the defendant's motion for bail due to the risk of flight and lack of new information.
Significance: This document is a court filing that argues against granting bail to the defendant due to the risk of flight and the strength of the government's case. It provides insight into the legal arguments and evidence presented in a criminal case.
Key Topics:
bail conditions
flight risk assessment
pretrial detention
Key People:
- the defendant - the individual requesting bail
Full Text
Page 4
are serious and carry lengthy terms of imprisonment if convicted; the evidence proffered by the Government, including multiple corroborating and corroborated witnesses, is strong; the Defendant has substantial resources and foreign ties (including citizenship in a country that does not extradite its citizens); and the Defendant, who lived in hiding and apart from the family to whom she now asserts important ties, has not been fully candid about her financial situation." (Dec. Op. at 2). In seeking bail for a third time, the defendant's Motion rests principally on two additional bail conditions. Neither of these conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance in court, and neither outweighs all of the other factors that make this defendant an extreme flight risk. Moreover, the Court should reject as premature the defendant's assertion that her pretrial motions have somehow weakened the Government's case; those motions have not been adjudicated, and, for the reasons set forth in the Government's opposition memorandum, the defendant's motions have no merit.
In short, all three of the relevant Bail Reform Act factorsâthe nature and circumstances of the offense, the strength of the evidence, and the history and characteristics of the defendantâcontinue to weigh heavily in favor of detention, and the defendant's Motion does not present any information that warrants revisiting this Court's well-reasoned and detailed prior decisions.
A. Applicable Law
"After a court has made an initial determination that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the appearance of the Defendant as required, the Court may reopen the bail hearing if 'information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue' of whether pretrial detention is warranted." (Dec. Op. at 4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). "A court may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent authority, even where the circumstances do not match § 3142(f)'s statutory text." (Id. at 5). Although courts in this Circuit have recognized that "a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing," United States v. Rowe, No. 02 Cr. 756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003), generally the moving party must establish that its arguments "warrant reconsideration" by, for example, demonstrating "that the court overlooked information or incorrectly applied the law," or that failure to reconsider "would constitute manifest injustice." United States v. Petrov, No. 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015).
B. Discussion
The defendant's Motion rests on three arguments, none of which is availing. First, the defendant offers to renounce her foreign citizenship, claiming that this eliminates the risk that she will flee from prosecution. Second, the defendant offers to place some of her assets in a monitorship with unspecified terms, and which would still leave her with substantial unrestrained assets. Third, the defendant claims that her voluminous pretrial motions have diminished the strength of the Government's case. None of these arguments is persuasive, and the Motion should be denied.
DOJ-OGR-00001246
--- PAGE BREAK ---
least $2 million. In addition, the defendant proposes that she retain an additional half a million dollars in liquid assets in an unrestrained account, as well as any future income.2 That figure appears to be in addition to the approximately $1 million in âchattelsâ the defendant has disclosed among her various assets. See Dkt. 97, Ex. O at 9. In short, the defendantâs proposal would leave her with ample resources to fund her flight from prosecution.
Further still, the defendantâs Motion provides only cursory details of the monitorship program she proposes, and it offers no legal precedent to explain what, if any, authority this Court has to establish and oversee such a monitorship. Aside from defense counselâs assertions, the Motion offers nothing that would enable the Court to meaningfully consider the details of such a monitorship. Among other things, it is unclear from the defendantâs Motion whether such a program would require the defendantâs voluntary compliance with the monitorship, or whether the funds would be placed in a bank account that the defendant could not access. Given that the defendantâs Motion suggests that attorneyâs fees could be disbursed without approval, it appears that the defendantâs proposal would provide her latitude to engage in financial transactions, subject only to a review that would require her voluntary compliance.
Finally, although the defendant does not provide any detail about the amount of money she would pay the monitor, presumably the monitor would not undertake this responsibility for free. As a result, the tension between the monitorâs obligation to review the defendantâs finances and the monitorâs employment relationship with the defendant creates a conflict of interest. But at bottom, if the Court determines that the only way to keep the defendant from using her assets to flee is to take away control of her assets, then she is too great a flight risk to release.
In sum, in light of this Courtâs determination that the defendant âhas not been fully candid about her financial situation,â the Court should reject the defendantâs vague proposal. (Dec. Op. at 2). Nothing in the defendantâs Motion should alter the Courtâs determination that the defendant poses a significant risk of flight, and that she has the resources and skills to flee prosecution. The Court should reject the proposed bail conditions.
3. The Defendantâs Pending Pretrial Motions Have Not Diminished the Strength of the Governmentâs Case
Finally, the defendant also argues that the ânumerous substantive pretrial motions now before the Court amply challenge the purported strength of the governmentâs case.â (Mot. at 7). But the defendant cannot merely point to the sheer volume of briefing she has filed to suggest that the strength of the Governmentâs case has diminished. To the contrary, as the Government has set forth in detail in its memorandum in opposition, the defendantâs pretrial motions are entirely without merit. In any event, it is premature for the defendant to claim that her pretrial motionsâwhich have not been adjudicated, much less grantedâhave altered the Courtâs original
2 The defendantâs proposal also leaves unrestrained several million dollars in escrow for the defendantâs legal fees. See Dkt. 97, Ex. O at 9 (listing approximately $7.6 million in retainer fees); see also Mot. at 6. If the defendant fled the country, her counsel would presumably be required to return those funds to the defendant, who would no longer need defense counsel in this case.
Individual Pages
Page 4 - DOJ-OGR-00001246
Page 8 - DOJ-OGR-00001250
least $2 million. In addition, the defendant proposes that she retain an additional half a million dollars in liquid assets in an unrestrained account, as well as any future income.2 That figure appears to be in addition to the approximately $1 million in âchattelsâ the defendant has disclosed among her various assets. See Dkt. 97, Ex. O at 9. In short, the defendantâs proposal would leave her with ample resources to fund her flight from prosecution.
Further still, the defendantâs Motion provides only cursory details of the monitorship program she proposes, and it offers no legal precedent to explain what, if any, authority this Court has to establish and oversee such a monitorship. Aside from defense counselâs assertions, the Motion offers nothing that would enable the Court to meaningfully consider the details of such a monitorship. Among other things, it is unclear from the defendantâs Motion whether such a program would require the defendantâs voluntary compliance with the monitorship, or whether the funds would be placed in a bank account that the defendant could not access. Given that the defendantâs Motion suggests that attorneyâs fees could be disbursed without approval, it appears that the defendantâs proposal would provide her latitude to engage in financial transactions, subject only to a review that would require her voluntary compliance.
Finally, although the defendant does not provide any detail about the amount of money she would pay the monitor, presumably the monitor would not undertake this responsibility for free. As a result, the tension between the monitorâs obligation to review the defendantâs finances and the monitorâs employment relationship with the defendant creates a conflict of interest. But at bottom, if the Court determines that the only way to keep the defendant from using her assets to flee is to take away control of her assets, then she is too great a flight risk to release.
In sum, in light of this Courtâs determination that the defendant âhas not been fully candid about her financial situation,â the Court should reject the defendantâs vague proposal. (Dec. Op. at 2). Nothing in the defendantâs Motion should alter the Courtâs determination that the defendant poses a significant risk of flight, and that she has the resources and skills to flee prosecution. The Court should reject the proposed bail conditions.
3. The Defendantâs Pending Pretrial Motions Have Not Diminished the Strength of the Governmentâs Case
Finally, the defendant also argues that the ânumerous substantive pretrial motions now before the Court amply challenge the purported strength of the governmentâs case.â (Mot. at 7). But the defendant cannot merely point to the sheer volume of briefing she has filed to suggest that the strength of the Governmentâs case has diminished. To the contrary, as the Government has set forth in detail in its memorandum in opposition, the defendantâs pretrial motions are entirely without merit. In any event, it is premature for the defendant to claim that her pretrial motionsâwhich have not been adjudicated, much less grantedâhave altered the Courtâs original
2 The defendantâs proposal also leaves unrestrained several million dollars in escrow for the defendantâs legal fees. See Dkt. 97, Ex. O at 9 (listing approximately $7.6 million in retainer fees); see also Mot. at 6. If the defendant fled the country, her counsel would presumably be required to return those funds to the defendant, who would no longer need defense counsel in this case.